The Generation of Social Capital: Society and Institution Centered Models Studies of social capital are divided on its causes and origins. On the one side are scholars who argue that variations in the amount and type of social capital can be explained primarily by society-centered approaches. 9 In this Tocquevillian approach, the capacity of a society to produce social capital among its citizens is determined by its long-term experience of social organization, anchored in historical and cultural experiences that can be traced back over very long periods. The society-centered approach views regular social interaction, preferably through membership in voluntary associations, as the most important mechanism for the generation of social capital. Following the Tocquevillian tradition, formal and informal associations and networks are seen as creators of social capital because of their socializing effects on democratic and cooperative values and norms.
A number of studies carried out in different democratic countries over the last few years has called into question the effect of participation in many voluntary associations directed at benevolent purposes on social trust and the willingness to cooperate outside of the specific group. While it is true that people who are joiners also generally trust others more, this categorization seems to be an effect of self-selection. People who-for some other reason-score high on the social ability to trust and cooperate with others join voluntary associations disproportionately. However, activity in such organizations does not add much in these desired traits, at least not for adults. Members become purely more trusting of their fellow members and they cooperate more for group purposes only. I" Thus, the evidence that associational membership of adults creates social capital that can be used in the wider society simply does not hold."I A second issue is that, even if the importance of voluntary engagement is accepted, not all associations serve a normatively desirable purpose. In fact, many associations are established to create distrust. Alan Brinkley refers to parochial communities that do not reach out but instead manifest and nurture an inward-looking and segregating culture.'2 Sheri Berman has argued that the Nazis in Weimar Germany used existing voluntary associations as vehicles for their Machtfibernahme.'3 Far from such extreme cases, some voluntary associations may use their power, for example as producer organizations, to extract resources from society in a way that comes close to blackmail, giving undue or disproportional advantages to their members to the detriment of the rest of society. 14 The problem of having good and bad associations is readily admitted in social capital research, and promising new analyses distinguish groups according to the degree of contact members have with individuals unlike themselves. This distinction in social interaction has been labeled as bridging (contact with many people who are dissimilar) versus bonding (contact with people like oneself). Bridging interactions are believed to create more desirable outcomes. 'I In a similar vein, Warren distinguishes between groups oriented toward status, group identity, and material goods, as well as those focused on inclusive social, public, or identity goods. 16 However, both theoretical accounts need to be tested empirically. 17 Generally, the struggle to distinguish between the good, the bad, and the ugly in the world of voluntary associations underlines the lack of theoretical parameters that define a micro-theory of social capital. The use of membership in adult voluntary associations as a measurement of social capital should be handled with great caution, and its use as a producer of social capital is in all likelihood misplaced.
As a response to the society-centered approach, the institution-centered accounts of social capital theory claim that for social capital to flourish it needs to be embedded in and linked to the political context as well as formal political and legal institutions.18
According to this group of scholars, government institutions and policies create, channel, and influence social capital. However, it is noteworthy that the "new institutionalism" and the social capital research agenda have been mostly disconnected. 19 Two main types of institutional arguments can be distinguished in relation to social capital: an attitudinal and an institutional-structural approach. In the former, scholars examine the relationship between institutional/political trust and generalized trust. For example, Hall indicates that political trust and generalized trust are correlated in Britain. 20 Kaase discusses the consistently positive but weak correlation between the two types of trust in cross-national survey samples. The Role of Political Institutions, but Which Ones?
As stated above, the problem is that many forms of institutional trust and confidence are collapsed under one label as trust in government. No distinction has been made between confidence in the institutions on the representational side of the political system (parties, parliaments, cabinets) and confidence in the institutions on the implementation side of the political system. The theoretical reason why the confidence that people place in these two types of political institutions differ is the following. On the representational side, one of the main roles for political institutions is to be partisan. A political party that holds government power is supposed to try to implement its ideology in a partisan way. Thus, people who support the ideology of the ruling party (or parties) are likely to have confidence in them, while citizens who oppose their ideology are likely to report a lack of confidence. However, it is less likely that this type of partisan trust or distrust should influence one's generalized trust in other people. There is no plausible causal mechanism linking these two phenomena. A strong correlation is thus usually between political leanings and political trust, but a weak correlation is found between confidence in these types of political institutions and social trust.29 The weak findings of causal relationships between generalized trust and trust in government are mostly due to this failure to distinguish the cause of trust in various kinds of political institutions.
The major source of variations in generalized trust is to be found at the other side of the state machinery, the legal and administrative branches of the state responsible for the implementation of public policies. These branches of government need to be distinguished from the influence of representational institutions such as the legislative and the executive for two main reasons. First, while the basis for trusting (or distrusting) the institutions dominated by politicians is partisanship, the reason for trusting civil servants, judges, the police, and social service institutions is their even-handedness and/or impartiality.30
Second, compared to other political institutions the courts, the police, and the other legal institutions of the state have a special task: to detect and punish people who, in game theory parlance, use opportunistic strategies (treacherous would be a better term). In other words, these political institutions-the order institutions-are in the business of However, the type oftrust that can thrive in such communities would be particularized and not generalized trust. For example, the small, dense niche networks in former East Germany characterized by high levels of in-group trust were so special because they actually were created as a protection against weak ties and other types of broader networks.32 The high degree of norm conformity within such networks and the resulting trust relations can not be revealed and applied to the outside world. what one needs in life one must be engaged in various forms of corruption. Hence the individual agent will witness the use of corruption among fellow citizens and will feel obliged to engage in corrupt practices in order to get what he or she deems necessary in life. However, there can be no generalized trust in those individuals who just take advantage of others and the system. Fourth, they cause positive or negative experiences with these institutions when in direct contact with them. Corrupt and unfair institutions, for example, might lead to experiences of discrimination and injustice, which negatively influence generalized trust.
Empirical Illustrations
Data and Methods This theory will be demonstrated with a variety of data sources and methods. First, it will be explored in a pooled cross-sectional data set whether the general argument about varieties of institutional confidence and trust holds and whether certain types of institutions such as the legal system, the police, and social welfare institutions play a more important role for generalized trust than the political/representational institutions. to function as their agents; at the same time, they focus on neutrality, fairness, and impartiality. Moreover, citizens expect more political bias from elected offices, whereas they expect impartiality from order institutions. Of course, the lack of impartiality of order institutions damages generalized trust; alternatively, an institution's perceived impartiality should support generalized trust. Is it possible to determine the difference between trust in political institutions that are perhaps seen as partisan and trust in order institutions from which citizens should expect more fairness and impartiality?
In order to see whether trust in various political institutions actually falls into different dimensions, the individual level third wave of the World Values Survey was subjected to a factor analysis.37 As the results in Table 1 Under this dimension falls trust in the army, legal institutions, and the police. A third dimension taps confidence in institutions that are mostly control institutions that check the power of institutions with elected offices; this dimension includes the media (see Table 1 ). In other words, citizens do make distinctions between government institutions in the way the theory predicts, particularly as political institutions are distinguished from those that help preserve law and order. The question now is whether these different types of institutional confidence also reveal differences in their relationship to generalized trust. Surely the development of this causal mechanism ensures a causal logic that underlies the empirical analysis, yet if institutions are in any way responsible for social capital in the form of generalized trust, then a connection ought to be seen longitudinally as well. In other words, if institutions become more or less impartial over time, a positive or negative effect on generalized trust, respectively, would be expected. In fact, these effects might be asymmetrical; a loss in impartiality might be more devastating to generalized trust than a gain is to its development. Accordingly, strong negative consequences for generalized trust would be expected when trust in order institutions has declined in countries over time.
For Since it has been established that citizens distinguish between various types of institutional trust and that at the aggregate level generalized trust is more closely related to trust in order institutions than to institutions with elected offices, the next task is to 
Institutional Characteristics and Generaliz
The question, then, is whether not only perce Furthermore, a measure of equality of outcomes, the GINI index was included. More egalitarian societies without major socioeconomic gaps are believed to achieve higher levels of generalized trust than societies in which inequality is rampant.46
In the multivariate model, control variables that are related to generalized trust at the country level are also included. Basic patterns of religion, ethnic and religious fractionalization, and the experience of Communism, as well as classic network indicators of social capital, such as aggregated memberships in voluntary associations, should all matter for generalized trust. 4 For example, Protestant countries, countries with a high GDP per capita and high secondary educational enrollment rates, and countries with fewer ethnic and religious divisions should be better able to develop interpersonal citizen trust than other countries. Of course, the GDP per capita and educational enrollment also play a role, but these factors are not included in the baseline model because they are highly correlated with the institutional variables and other controls. 48 In the multivariate model, Protestant culture, ethnic and religious diversity, the influence of a Communist background, and membership in voluntary associations are used as the most important cultural control variables, but the other factors are not used in the baseline model because all institutional variables are related to the longevity of democracy, GDP per capita, and educational enrollment and these variables are also related to each other. Because of multicollinearity, therefore, the institutional variables are examined individually in addition to the baseline model.49 GDP per capita and secondary school enrollment did not withstand the multivariate test and lost statistical significance in a multivariate model. As Table 2 indicates, all institutional variables are significantly related to generalized trust, even when controlling for important societal characteristics and historical experiences. Countries with high levels of generalized trust also have the most effective and impartial institutions and the longest experiences with democracy, as well as most egalitarian socioeconomic outcomes, controlled for important societal attributes.
Moreover, the theory implies that, when institutional effectiveness and impartiality come together, particularly strong effects on trust should be seen. Therefore, an interaction term was created by multiplying institutional efficiency and impartiality. Countries with institutions that are both efficient and impartial have significantly higher levels of trust than other countries. The interaction effect accounts for 3.2 percent of the variance in generalized trust.S0 In a second interaction model countries with highly efficient institu tions were compared to all others, and this score was multiplied with the impartiality measure. Both models indicate that the effect ofhigh institutional impartiality conditional upon high effectiveness is particularly strong. In order to examine the relationship between institutional characteristics and experiences as well as generalized trust fully, it is necessary to analyze this connection in a multivariate micro model as well.
Linkages at the Micro Level Do individual experiences with institutions also translate into specific patterns of generalized trust, as the theory would predict? To get closer to the way the causal mechanism operates at the micro level, it was analyzed whether trust in order institutions influences generalized trust in a multivariate setting. If trust in order institutions remains an important factor in relation to generalized trust, even when controlling for other variables, there would be further evidence for how the theory works at the micro level. Results for tests in three different data sets-the Swedish SOM surveys, the ESC Canadian national survey, and the second and third waves of the World Value surveys-are presented. Table 3 shows three similar models in three different data sets in which the micro relationship between institutional experiences and generalized trust is analyzed. However, a ranking of some political institutions exists. According to the theory, the ranking of courts and the police as political institutions from which citizens expect impartiality and effectiveness should be highly correlated with values of generalized trust. Indeed, the relationship between selected institutional ratings and generalized trust is found. Those citizens who rate courts highly are also those who trust other citizens, controlling for a variety of factors, including a ranking of the government.
More specifically, each additional point on the 0-100 court rating scale increases the odds of generalized trust by about 10 percent, controlling for other variables in the model. The courts take a more important role here than the police and the government, although these 
Conclusion
The structure and characteristics of contemporary government institutions are both important and often overlooked factors that matter for the generation of generalized trust.
The theory presented here explains how the causal flow from impartial institutions to generalized trust might operate. The procedural fairness of these institutions influences citizens' institutional trust and, more specifically, how citizens experience feelings of safety and protection, how they make inferences from the system and public officials to other citizens, how they observe the behavior of fellow citizens, and how they experience discrimination against themselves or those close to them.
Empirical data provide evidence for these causal mechanisms. The empirical analysis especially works at both the micro and the macro levels. Citizens seem to make distinctions between various types of institutions, and trust in order institutions and in other institutions that implement policy is more important for generalized trust than other types of institutional confidence, in most of the models. A key point is the direction of causality. How can it be proven that institutions shape social capital and not the other way around? Clearly, many more tests and analyses have to be performed in order to ensure that this direction of causality holds. However, the first step in this discussion must surely be the development of a causal mechanism based on a strong theoretical account. Taken alone, each of the results is not enough to make the point. Yet the causal mechanism and the multiplicity of results presented throughout this article reveal a great deal about how civic attitudes such as trust are related to and most likely embedded in impartial, fair, and efficient institutions.
Finally, important policy implications may follow from these results. If the society centered model is correct, governments can claim that the main problems that plague their societies are caused by too little volunteering. To make democracy work and the economy grow, citizens have to get involved. However, if the theory presented here is correct, governments can not blame their citizens for the lack of social capital. Instead, the policy message becomes a very different one: that the lack of social capital is caused by dysfunctional government institutions.
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